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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The following question is presented on appeal, together with those subsidiary
questions fairly included therein, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4):
1.

Whether the court of appeals erred in its determination of what constitutes

an appearance for purposes of rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
REFERENCE TO REPORTED DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The court of appeals' decision was reported as Arbogast Family Trust v. River
Crossings, LLC, 2008 UT App 277, 191 P.3d 39. A copy is attached hereto.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) and (5) and
Utah R. App. P. 45 because this is a review of a decision of the court of appeals pursuant
to the Court's Order dated November 20, 2008 granting River Crossing's Petition for
Writ of Certiorari on the above stated issue.
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CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
URCP 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Service: When required.
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the
court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading
subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written
motion other than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand,
offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties.
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that:
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court;
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be
served with all pleadings and papers;
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any hearing
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party;
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of
judgment under Rule 58A(d); and
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in
default for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in
Rule 4.
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, in which no person is named as
defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or
appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at
the time of its seizure.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns the definition of what constitutes an "appearance" under
Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Virtually all of the federal courts to have
considered this issue have adopted the position that an "appearance" under the federal
counterpart to Rule 5(a) merely requires an indication of a "clear purpose to defend the
suit". See e ^ , New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2005). Only one circuit
has deviated from the general rule, mandating a much more rigorous standard that only
the filing of a formal pleading before the trial court can constitute an appearance under
Rule 5(a). See, e.g., Zuelzke Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Anderson Die Castings, Inc., 925 F.2d
226, 230 (7th Cir. 1991).
In its decision below, the court of appeals acknowledged that "the supreme court
has never explicitly addressed the two competing lines of authority or defined what
constitutes an appearance under rule 5." Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC,
2008 UT App 277 f 22. Nevertheless, the court of appeals relied on two decisions of this
Court, which it inconsistently stated had "interpreted rule 5 and addressed what
constitutes an appearance," in embracing the minority view. Id. ^[14. In fact, neither of
these decisions directly addressed the issue now before the Court and neither decision
mandated adoption of a minority position that runs directly counter to the oft-repeated
public policy disfavoring default judgments and disposition of cases on procedural
technicalities. See Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc.,
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).
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Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review
Arbogast Family Trust (Arbogast) provided River Crossings a $2,450,000 loan.
The loan was to be repaid with interest by September 16, 2005. The loan agreement
provided that, if repayment were more than five days late, there would be "[a] late
payment penalty of [s]ix percent." River Crossings repaid the loan in full on October 7,
2005. Because the loan was not repaid within five days of September 16, 2005, Arbogast
claimed it was entitled to a late payment penalty of over $148,000, plus interest. River
Crossings stated that it was granted an extension of time to repay the loan and therefore
contested that it owed any additional amount. Because of the dispute between the parties,
River Crossings directed that approximately $178,000 be held in escrow until the dispute
was resolved. These funds were eventually deposited with the trial court. Arbogast, 2008
UTApp277^[2.
District Court Proceedings and Disposition
On January 10, 2006, Arbogast filed a complaint for declaratory judgment,
seeking to obtain the funds held in escrow. Because River Crossings had previously
informed Arbogast that it was represented by counsel and because of difficulties serving
River Crossings directly, the trial court granted Arbogast's motion for alternate service.
Accordingly, Arbogast served River Crossings' Nevada legal counsel, Black, LoBello &
Sparks (BLS), with the complaint. Counsel for Arbogast granted BLS at least two
extensions to make a settlement offer, to seek Utah counsel, or both. According to River
Crossings, counsel for Arbogast then told BLS, counsel for River Crossings, in June 2006
that he would not seek default without first notifying them. Id. % 3.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On June 28, 2006, BLS communicated a settlement offer to Arbogast's counsel.
The next day, counsel for Arbogast sent a letter to BLS rejecting the offer. The letter also
stated as follows:
My client has previously granted your client an extension of
time within which to answer the complaint. However, given
the present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client,
hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter.
Id 14.
On June 30, 2006 the attorney at BLS primarily responsible for the River
Crossings matter was terminated. However, the June 29 letter was addressed to two other
members of the firm who had taken responsibility for the case. On July 25, River
Crossings1 managing member sent an e-mail to Arbogast's principal. Although the e-mail
requested that Arbogast's principal call River Crossings' managing member in order to
"discuss the direction of [the] lawsuit," no further communication occurred. Six days
later—approximately four months after service of the complaint and more than thirty
days after the June 29 letter requesting an answer—Arbogast obtained a certificate of
default from the court clerk. Arbogast did not serve River Crossings or its counsel with a
copy of this certificate or its subsequent request for default judgment. On August 10, the
trial judge entered a default judgment. Notice of the judgment was sent to River
Crossings on August 15. Id. f 5.
River Crossings filed a rule 60 motion to set aside the default judgment on
September 26, 2006, and arguments were held February 21, 2007. During arguments,
River Crossings' Utah legal counsel acknowledged that "this is a close case." Counsel
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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also conceded that a formal appearance had not been entered and that "[Arbogast] didn't
need to give notice [of the default motions] under Rule 5(2)(a)." In fact, counsel declared
that he was "not claiming that because an appearance was made notice should have been
given." The trial court determined "that [River Crossings'] actions and inactions in this
matter d[id] not rise to the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or mistake."
The trial court also found that although BLS did not formally appear in the action,
"counsel's notification and communications with [Arbogast]'s counsel constitute an
appearance and there was adequate notice . . . given to [River Crossings], pursuant to the
June 29, 2006 letter." Accordingly, the court denied River Crossings' motion. River
Crossings appealed. Id. % 6.
Court of Appeals Proceedings and Disposition
The court of appeals overturned the district court's ruling that River Crossings had
appeared in the action and, on that basis, affirmed the district court's ultimate conclusion
that River Crossings was not entitled to service of Plaintiff's default certificate or request
for entry of default judgment under Rule 5(a). It affirmed judgment in favor of Arbogast.
DISCUSSION
I.

THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DO NOT LIMIT AN
"APPEARANCE" FOR PURPOSES OF RULE 5(a) TO "FORMAL
APPEARANCES" BEFORE THE COURT.
Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "every judgment,

every order . . . , every pleading . . . , every paper . . . , every written motion . . . , and
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be
served upon each of the parties. " Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1). As noted by the Utah Court of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appeals below, "[t]his rule 'expresses the general principle that notice of all proceedings
[, including default proceedings,] must be provided to all parties.'" Arbogast Family
Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 2008 UT App 277 <j[ 12 (quoting Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT
75, H 20-27). Although no service need be made on parties in default for failure to
appear, "a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear must be served
with all pleadings and papers." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(B).
At issue on appeal is whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that only a
"formal appearance" before a court, such as the filing of an answer, could constitute an
"appearance" under Rule 5(a). No Utah court has directly addressed this issue. Arbogast,
2008 UT App 277 f 22 ("[T]he supreme court has never explicitly . . . defined what
constitutes an appearance under rule 5."). This Court has, however, previously held that
the "federal interpretation [of the notice requirements under rule 5] is persuasive in light
of the fact that our rule 5 is 'substantially similar to federal rule 5.'" Lund v. Brown, 2000
UT 75, f 26; see also Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 740 n.9 (Utah 1990) ("Because there
is virtually no case law interpreting the Utah rule and because of the close
correspondence between the federal and state rules, we freely look to federal case law as
a useful guide.")1

1

Courts construing the term "appearance" under Rule 5(a) have also looked to the
case law interpreting the term "appearance" under Rule 55, governing procedure as to
defaults, and have interpreted the term identically under both rules. E.g., N.Y. Life Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996) ("This discussion of appearances is
drawn from caselaw on Rule 55(b)(2) appearances . . . . Rule 5(a) appearances will be
treated the same, as both 55(b)(2) and 5(a) involve defendants who at one time appeared,
but later defaulted.") Consequently, this Court can rely on case law interpreting
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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7

Under the federal rules, an "appearance" is not limited to a direct response to a
complaint. Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, 10A Fed. Prac. &
Proc., Civil 3d § 2686.
An appearance 'may arise by implication from defendant's
seeking, taking, or agreeing to some step or proceeding in the
cause beneficial to himself or detrimental to plaintiff other
than one contesting only the jurisdiction'.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Heleasco Seventeen, Inc. v. Drake, 102 F.R.D. 909, 912
(D.C. Del. 1984) (holding that defendants made an "appearance" when their attorney
initiated telephone conversations with plaintiffs attorney)).
A party need merely indicate a "clear purpose to defend the suit" to satisfy the
appearance requirement under the federal rules. New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 105
(2nd Cir. 2005). An appearance is "not confined to physical appearances in court or the
actual filing of a document in the record." N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141
(5th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).
Appearances include a variety of informal acts on defendant's
part which are responsive to plaintiff's formal action in court,
and which may be regarded as sufficient to give plaintiff a
clear indication of defendant's intention to contest the claims.
In summary, an appearance is an indication in some way of
an intent to pursue a defense. This is a relatively low
threshold.

appearances under both Rule 5(a) and Rule 55(b)(2) for guidance in defining what
constitutes an appearance under Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Id. at 141-42 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (cited in Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. &
Proc. § 1144); accord Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Savs. Assoc, 874 F.2d
274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. McCoy, 954 F.2d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir. 1992).
Although this interpretation is sometimes referred to as the "majority" view, such
a characterization unfortunately conveys the impression of a close, active dispute
between the circuits. In reality, this "majority" approach is the generally accepted
practice in virtually all of the federal circuits, save perhaps one. The Seventh Circuit
alone has generally followed a strict, inflexible approach, holding that only a formal
submission or presentation to the court can satisfy the demands of the "appearance"
requirement under Rule 5(a). See e^., Zuelzke Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Anderson Die
Castings, Inc., 925 F.2d 226, 230 (7th Cir 1991).
Every other federal circuit to consider the issue has adopted the liberal, equitable
interpretation of "appearance" under the Rule. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, and D.C.
Circuits have all embraced the majority view, as have state and federal district courts in
Alabama, Delaware, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Muniz v.
Vidal, 739 F.2d 699, 701 (1 st Cir. 1984); Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966)
(single telephone request for extension by counsel constituted appearance); N.Y. Life Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996) (single telephone call to plaintiffs counsel
constituted appearance); Lutomski v. Panther Valley Coin Exchange, 653 F.2d 270, 271
(6th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Harre, 983 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir. 1993) (late-filed and
subsequently stricken answer constitutes appearance); Wilson v. Moore & Assocs., 564
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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F.2d 366, 369 (9 Cir. 1977) (appearance "need not necessarily be a formal one, i.e., one
involving a submission or presentation to a court"); H.F. Livermore Corp. v.
Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder L., 432 F.2d 689, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curium);
Cockrell v. World's Finest Chocolate Co., Inc., 349 So.2d 1117, 1120 (Ala. 1977);
Heleasco Seventeen, Inc. v. Drake, 102 F.R.D. 909, 912 (D. Del. 1984) (telephone
exchanges between parties' counsel constituted appearance); Ryan Transportation Serv.,
Inc. v. Paschall Servs., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2141 *6-7 (D. Kans. 2004)
(appearance where defendant sought extension to seek counsel within jurisdiction);
Segars v. Hagerman, 99 F.R.D. 274 (N.D. Miss. 1983); Trust Company Bank v. TingenMillford Drapery Co., Inc., 119 F.R.D. 21, 22-23 (E.D.N.C. 1987); Wilson v. Wilson,
364 N.W.2d 113, 115 (N.D. 1985) (appearance where parties discussed case); Liberty
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Yackovich, 99 F.R.D. 518 (W.D. Pa. 1982); CSB Corp. v.
Cadillac Creative Advertising, Inc., 136 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D. R.L 1990) (finding appearance
based on settlement negotiations); Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door Sales Co., 49 F.R.D 3
(D.S.C. 1970); Dalminter v. Jessie Edwards, 27 F.R.D. 491, 493 (S.D. Tex. 1961)
(appearance where defendant contact plaintiff's counsel by letter).
For example, in Heleasco, the court held that telephone exchanges between the
parties' counsel constituted an appearance, explaining:
Normally, an appearance is used to signify the overt act by a
party involving some presentation or submissions to the
Court's jurisdiction. A defendant, however, need not respond
directly to the complaint in order for his conduct to constitute
an appearance. The appearance required by Rule 55(b)(2) has
been broadly defined and it is not limited to a "formal" court
appearance. An appearance may arise by implication from
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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defendants seeking, taking or agreeing to some steps or
proceedings in the cause beneficial to himself or detrimental
to plaintiff.
Heleasco, 102 F.R.D at 912 (citing 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Fed. Prac. &
Proa: Civil 2d f 2686 (1973) (emphasis added)).
In Lutomski, the Sixth Circuit held that defendants had made an appearance
entitling them to notice of default where plaintiffs granted two extensions by telephone to
defendants, explaining:
Though it is true that defendants made no formal appearance
and filed no papers, courts now look beyond the presence or
absence of such formal actions to examine other evidence of
active representation. Several cases have held that informal
contacts between parties may constitute an appearance. The
contacts must "indicate the defaulting party intends to defend
the suit."
Lutomski, 653 F.2d at 271 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In New York Life, the 5th Circuit held that a single telephone call to plaintiffs
counsel contesting the claim, constituted an appearance. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84
F.3d 137, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1996).
In Charlton L. Davis & Co., P.C. v. Fedder Data Center, Inc., 556 F.2d 308 (5th
Cir. 1977), the court held that an appearance had been entered where, after discovering
the case was in default, counsel "both telephoned and wrote the plaintiffs attorney,
indicating an intent to defend and requesting an extension of time because of a trial in
another case." Id. at 308-09. Noting that "[t]he appearance required by the rule has been
broadly defined, and not limited to a court appearance," the court explained:
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If the plaintiff felt Financial was guilty of dilatory tactics and
had no real defense, then notice under Rule 55 would have
promptly resolved the matter. Instead, the plaintiff sought to
reap tactical advantage from Financial's prior neglect by
acquiring in stealth a decision sheltered by the rules which
protect final judgments. Such practice is what Rule 55 was
designed to prevent.
Id.
These cases are representative of the holdings of virtually every federal court to
consider the issue of what constitutes an appearance under the federal rules. Given the
substantial similarity between Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 5
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah courts should follow the lead of the vast
majority of federal courts to consider the issue by likewise expressly adopting the
majority definition of an "appearance" under Rule 5(a).
II.

THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
MANDATE A LIBERAL DEFINITION OF "APPEARANCE" UNDER THE
RULES.
The majority approach has been so broadly adopted nationwide because it is far

more in harmony with the policies underlying the procedural rules, which strongly favor
a hearing of the merits of each case and disfavor procedural technicalities.
Since the law dislikes judgments by default, courts generally
would prefer to deny plaintiffs application in favor of a trial
on the merits. Thus, in order to ensure defendant an
opportunity to defend against plaintiff's application, a court
usually will try to find that there has been an appearance by
defendant, which has the effect of requiring that notice of the
application for a default be given.
Wright, Miller & Kane, 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc: Civil 3d § 2686 (emphasis added).
The policy underlying the modernization of federal
procedure, namely the abandonment or relaxation of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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restrictive rules which prevent the hearing of cases on their
merits is central to this issue. This court has been mindful of
this policy in its construction of the Rules in order to afford
litigants a fair opportunity to have their disputes settled by
reference to the merits.
Given this approach, the default judgment must normally be
viewed as available only when the adversary process has been
halted because of an essentially unresponsive party. . . . The
notice requirement contained in Rule 55(b)(2) is, however, a
device intended to protect those parties who, although
delaying in a formal sense by failing to file pleadings within
the twenty-day period, have otherwise indicated to the
moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit.
H.F. Livermore, 432 F.2d at 691 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed for the
just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of cases on their
merits, not for the termination of litigation by procedural
maneuver. Default judgments are a drastic remedy, not
favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in
extreme situations.
Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Savs. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir.
1989) (emphasis added) (holding that "appearance" under the federal rules must be
broadly defined).
Utah courts have likewise repeatedly recognized this fundamental policy
underlying the procedural rules.
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and
to move calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to
date. But it is even more important to keep in mind that the
very reason for the existence of courts is to afford disputants
an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them.
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879
(Utah 1975) (emphasis added); see also Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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190 (1962) ("The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a
full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case."); Richards v.
Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah 1996) (J. Stewart, dissenting) (stating that "rigidity of
common law code pleading . . . completely ignores the strong policy in our rules of civil
procedure in favor of deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural
technicalities."); Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah 1989) ("In Behrens
v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983), we reiterated that the
policy of our rules of procedure is to decide cases on the merits rather than pleading
technicalities.").
The majority position more fully reflects the policies underlying the procedural
rules by ensuring that parties who have indicated a willingness and intent to participate in
the proceedings and defend against the claims are not unjustly thrown out of court on a
technicality. It enables parties to engage in settlement negotiations in an effort to spare
the time and expense of filing pleadings or hiring local counsel by resolving the matter
without straining court resources. The majority approach therefore satisfies the policies
underlying the procedural rules by providing for a "just, speedy, and inexpensive
disposition of cases on their merits." See Utah R. Civ. Pro. 1; Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 1.
The so-called minority view, which was the approach embraced by the court of
appeals below, wholly ignores the core policies behind the rules—policies which strongly
disfavor default judgments and highly technical interpretations that prevent the hearing of
cases on their merits. In fact, nowhere in the Arbogast decision did the court of appeals
address the policy considerations underlying the rules. Instead, the court summarily
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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concluded that "one of the benefits of the minority position is that it creates a bright-line
test that the clerk can use when determining whether or not default is appropriate."
Arbogast, 2008 UT App f 20 n.9. However appealing a bright-line test may seem, the
expressly elucidated policies underlying the rules cannot be ignored simply to make
things easier for the court clerks.
Moreover, the minority approach provides no better bright-line test than the more
liberal, equitable approach followed by the vast majority of courts. The court of appeals
complained in its decision that, under the majority view, court clerks "cannot determine
with certainty whether any party has or has not 'appeared' in the action" because they are
not privy to "discussions or documents exchanged among the parties." Arbogast, 2008
UT App f 21 n.9 (quoting 10 James Wm. Moore et aL, Moore's Fed. Prac. § 55.33[4][b]
(3d ed. 2008)). Yet, clerks also are unaware of other matters that may affect the entry of
a default, such as whether an extension of time to respond to a complaint has been agreed
to between the parties. The clerk cannot determine with certainty whether default is
appropriate even under the minority approach.
In reality, formal adoption of the majority rale would not drastically change
current practices regarding default judgments. It would not prevent court clerks from
entering default if it appeared from the record that no appearance had been made. It
would simply provide a more equitable opportunity for defaulted parties who have
attempted to defend themselves to reverse the default judgment and have their day in
court. It also would provide an extra safeguard against procedural maneuvers and default
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judgments against unsuspecting defendants, thereby satisfying the policy demands
underlying the rules without increasing the burden on court clerks.
III.

UTAH CASE LAW IS MORE CONSISTENT WITH THE MAJORITY
VIEW.
The court of appeals erroneously concluded in its decision below that Utah case

law dictated adoption of the minority view of Rule 5(a). Although acknowledging that
"the supreme court has never explicitly addressed the two competing lines of authority or
defined what constitutes an appearance under rule 5," the court of appeals nevertheless
contended that adoption of the minority view was mandated by two Utah Supreme Court
cases: Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen and Lund v. Brown. Arbogast, 2008 UT f 22.
This conclusion was based on an imprecise reading of these cases.
The facts in Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982) are a
bit convoluted. After receiving Central Bank's initial complaint, the defendants' attorney
contacted Central Bank's counsel, requesting copies of the pleadings. Id. at 1010. Central
Bank's counsel refused to provide them unless defendants entered a general appearance.
Default judgment was subsequently entered after defendants failed to file an answer.
Central Bank's counsel did not provide notice of default to the defendants. Id.
Instead, when defendants' counsel again contacted him four days after the default was
entered to request copies of the complaint, Central Bank's counsel served a second
summons and complaint on defendant—even though default had already been entered on
the first complaint. Id. at 1011. Defendants then filed an answer and counterclaim to the
second complaint, which Central Bank moved to strike on the basis that default had
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already been entered on the first complaint. Defendants were not aware that default had
been entered until that time. Id.
On appeal, the defendants argued that "upon receipt of the answer and
counterclaim" and "in light of communications between counsel," Central Bank's
counsel had an obligation to notify their attorney of the default judgment already entered.
Id. (emphasis added). Although passing reference was made to the "communications
between counsel," it does not appear that defendants argued to the Court that the single
telephone call from their attorney to plaintiff's attorney prior to default constituted an
appearance. See id. Rather, it appears that the defendants were arguing that when their
attorney contacted Central Bank the second time and then filed an answer, Central Bank
was obligated to notify them of the default that had already been entered against them. In
response, the Court merely stated that "the rules expressly exclude parties in default from
those entitled to notice." Id. In other words, because default had already been entered,
Central Bank's attorney was not obligated to notify the defendants of that default even
when their attorney subsequently contacted Central Bank and filed an answer.
Even if the Central Bank defendants were suggesting that their single request for
copies of the pleadings prior to default constituted an appearance—which certainly is not
evident from the record—it does not appear that counsel or the Court were aware of,
much less analyzed, the abundant case law supporting the conclusion that a formal
pleading was not required to entitle defendants to notice under Rule 5(a). In fact, there is
no analysis of the issue whatsoever. The Court appears simply to have assumed, without
any independent research, discussion or analysis, that the defendants had not appeared
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and were in default, and then summarily rejected any claims of entitlement to notice. Id.
To construe the Central Bank case as standing for the proposition that only a formal
appearance before the court can constitute an appearance under Rule 5, when that issue
was never raised before the Court, would be inaccurate and improper.
Moreover, the facts in Central Bank present a prime example of why most federal
circuits have liberally defined "appearance" under Rule 5(a). Such unethical procedural
maneuvers are directly contrary to the policies underlying the rules.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed for the
just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of cases on their
merits, not for the termination of litigation by procedural
maneuver.
Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Savs. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir.
1989) (emphasis added). A judicial interpretation of Rule 5(a) that would sanction such
conduct at the expense of the intent and purpose of the rules cannot be supported.
In Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277, the second case relied upon by the
court of appeals below, the defendants filed an answer and counterclaim to the plaintiff's
complaint, but the plaintiff failed to respond to the counterclaim because he mistakenly
believed that an intervening bankruptcy had stayed the proceedings. Id. f|[ 3-4. Without
providing notice, the defendants sought default against the plaintiff on the counterclaim,
which default was subsequently entered. Id. f 5.
Although the Court overturned the default judgment under Rule 60(b), it
nevertheless went on to address the plaintiffs claim to lack of notice under Rule 5 in
order to take the opportunity to clarify the notice requirements for motions for default
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judgment, which were "not a model of clarity." Id. f][ 20-21. Before ever reaching the
facts of the case, the Lund Court carefully construed the language of Rule 5(a) under the
Utah Rules and concluded that "notice should be given to parties in default who have
made an appearance." Id. f 24. The Court further elaborated:
There is an obvious policy justification for distinguishing
between these two classes of defaulting parties. A much more
compelling case can be made for requiring notice to a party
who is in default but has nonetheless elected to participate at
some level in an action than for requiring notice to a party
who has declined to participate in any regard by simply
ignoring previous notice given in the form of the complaint.
Id.
The Court then explained that the "validity" of this interpretation was confirmed
by the fact that it "mirrors the interpretation that has been made of its federal
counterpart." Id. ff 25-26. The two sources to which the Court cited for this proposition
were the well-respected Wright & Miller treatise and the case of New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996). As discussed in detail in section I, supra, these
two sources both expressly declare that a "formal appearance" is not required to trigger
the notice requirements under Rule 5(a) and are firmly in the "majority" camp. The court
in New York Life emphatically declared:
What constitutes an appearance is not "confined to physical
appearances in court or the actual filing of a document in the
record." Appearances "include a variety of informal acts on
defendant's part which are responsive plaintiffs formal action
in court, and which may be regarded as sufficient to give
plaintiff a clear indication of defendant's intention to contest
the claim." In summary, an appearance is an indication "in
some way fofl an intent to pursue a defense." This is ^a
relatively low threshold."
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N.Y. Life, 84 F.3d 137, 141-42 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The New
York Life court then went on to hold that a single telephone call from the defendant to
plaintiff's counsel constituted an appearance, triggering notice requirements under Rule
5(a):
[H]is phone call to New York Life's counsel, informing him
that he would contest the suit, is also an appearance.
Id. at 142.
Against this backdrop, it is more than a bit surprising that the court of appeals
could have relied so heavily on Lund for its conclusion that Utah case law dictates
adoption of the minority view of Rule 5(a)—holding that only a formal appearance
before the court triggers notice requirements. It did so, in part, due to an overreliance on
the precedential value of Central Bank, a case cited in Lund. As explained above, it does
not appear that the Central Bank Court ever reached the issue of what precisely
constitutes an appearance under Rule 5(a) or whether something less than a "formal
appearance" might constitute an appearance for purpose of notice. The Lund Court
therefore cited to Central Bank solely for the proposition that a party who has made an
appearance is entitled to notice of default, while a party who has not made an appearance
is not entitled to notice of default. Lund, 2000 UT 75 <|[27.
Because there was no dispute as to whether the defaulting party in Lund had made
an appearance, there was no need whatsoever for the Lund Court to delve into the depths
of what constitutes an appearance under Rule 5(a). The Lund Court, therefore, had no
reason to attempt to construe, distinguish, or disavow Central Bank on those grounds. As
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in Central Bank, there is no analysis at all in Lund on the issue of formal versus informal
appearance. Instead the Lund Court merely restated the assumption of Central Bank—
that no appearance had been entered in that case—without going any further.
The court of appeals' improper reliance on Lund also resulted from its misreading
of statement made by this Court in that case, that "[a] much more compelling case can be
made for requiring notice to a party who is in default but has nonetheless elected to
participate at some level." Arbogast, 2007 UT App. 277 f 18 n.8 (quoting Lund, 2000 UT
75 f 24). Although the court of appeals was correct that this statement was not made in
specifically addressing what constitutes an appearance, it also was not made, as the court
suggested, in reference to the specific facts of Lund nor limited thereto. Id. Rather, this
statement was made in the abstract—in construing the language of Rule 5(a) in light of
the vital policy considerations at play. They are the same policy considerations relied
upon by courts and commentators alike in support of the "majority" view that a party
who has "elected to participate at some level" has made an appearance for purposes of
Rule 5(a) and is entitled to notice.
Ironically, in direct opposition to the court of appeals' holding below, the Lund
case actually provides strong support for the contention that Utah has adopted—or should
adopt—the "majority" view of Rule 5(a). It cites to federal case law and notable treatises
which espouse the majority view. It also acknowledges and emphasizes the important
policy considerations underlying this view that notice should be given to defaulting
parties who have participated at some level in order to ensure a hearing on the merits of
the case. Surely neither Central Bank nor Lund provide a sufficient basis for embracing a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

rigid, highly technical interpretation of Rule 5(a) that has been nearly universally rejected
by other courts and flies in the face of the policies underlying the rule.
IV.

THE UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
ADOPTION OF THE MAJORITY VIEW.

CIVILITY

MANDATE

The so-called minority view is also plainly inconsistent with the Utah Standards of
Professionalism and Civility, which were expressly adopted by the Utah Supreme Court
in its Rules of Professional Practice. Rule 14-301(16) states as follows:
Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a default without first
notifying other counsel whose identity is known, unless their
clients' legitimate rights could be adversely affected.
Id. (emphasis added).

Under the minority approach, Utah attorneys would not be

required to provide notice of default to opposing counsel with whom they had negotiated
unless they had made a "formal appearance." Yet, in doing so, they would be placed in
the untenable position of complying with the Rules of Civil Procedure while directly
violating the Rules of Professional Practice.

This is no mere hypothetical. As

acknowledged by the court of appeals below, this nonsensical result is precisely what has
occurred in this case. Arbogast 2008 UT App f 21 n.10. According to the court of
appeals, Arbogast's counsel, Mr. Utley, acted in full compliance with Rule 5(a) when he
failed to provide notice of default to River Crossings while at the same time directly
violating his professional obligations under Rule 14-301(16). Id. Surely, the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to present such an absurdity and a trap for unwary
attorneys.
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On the other hand, adoption of the majority rule perfectly comports with Utah's
Rules of Professional Practice. An attorney who provided notice of default to opposing
counsel with whom he or she had been in communication would satisfy both the demands
of Rule 5(a) and the ethical obligations of Rule 14-301(16).
CONCLUSION
Rule 5(a) mandates notice for defaulting parties who have appeared by uelect[ing]
to participate at some level" in the case. This view of Rule 5(a) has been adopted by
nearly every court to consider the issue and best comports with existing Utah case law.
This view also is most consistent with the policy considerations underlying the state and
federal procedural rules and the Utah Rules of Professional Practice. For the foregoing
reasons, Appellant River Crossings, LLC respectfully requests that the court of appeals'
decision be reversed and remanded.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2008.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
MCCARTHY
By:
Scott M. Lilja
Nicole M. Deforge
Attorneys for River Crossings, LLC
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CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Fifth District, St. George Department, Utah, granted default judgment in favor of
appellee trustee on its complaint against appellant debtor seeking to obtain the funds held in escrow. The trial court
denied the debtor's Utah R. Civ. P. 60 motion to set aside the default judgment, The debtor appealed.
OVERVIEW: The debtor argued that the trial court correctly determined that it had entered an appearance, but erred
when it ruled that adequate notice was given to it pursuant to the June 29, 2006 fetter. The trustee argued that unless
a party entered a formal appearance through a pleading in the trial court, it had not appeared and it was not entitled
to service under Utah R. Civ. P. 5. The appellate court found that, because the debtor's legal counsel never made
some presentation or submission to the district court, it never made an appearance pursuant to Rule 5. The debtor did
not show reasonable justification or excuse for its failure to answer. The debtor conceded to the trial court that this
was a close case. The appellate court would not reverse an admittedly, and demonstrably, close case. There was
nothing in the record demonstrating any communication from the debtor's legal counsel to the trustee's legal counsel
between June 29, 2006 and August 18, 2006. Because the case concerned the trustee's coJlection efforts and because
it was awarded attorney fees below, the trial court had to determine the reasonable attorney fees the trustee incurred
on appeal.
OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.
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OPINION BY: Carolyn B. McHuah ^
OPINION

[**41] McHUGH ^ f Judge:
[*P1] River Crossings, LLC (River Crossings) appeals the trial court's denial of its rule 60(fr) motion to set aside a
default judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60fb^. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
[*P2] Arbogast Family Trust (Arbogast) provided River Crossings a $ 2,450,000 loan. The loan was to be repaid with
interest by September 16, 2005. If repayment was more than five days late, the loan agreement provided for "[a] late
payment penalty of [s]ix percent." River Crossings repaid the loan in full on October 7, 2005. Because the loan was not
repaid within five days of September 16, 2005, Arbogast claimed it was entitled to a late payment penalty of over $
148,000, plus interest. River Crossings stated that it was granted an extension of time to repay the loan and therefore
contested that it owed any additional amount. Because of the dispute between the parties, River Crossings
[***2] directed that approximately $ 178,000 be held in escrow until the dispute was resolved. These funds were
eventually deposited with the trial court.
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[*P3] On January 10, 2006, Arbogast filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking to obtain the funds held in
escrow. Because River Crossings had previously informed Arbogast that it was represented by counsel and because of
difficulties serving River Crossings directly, the trial court granted Arbogast's motion for alternate service. Accordingly,
Arbogast served River Crossings' Nevada legal counsel, Black, LoBello & Sparks (BIS), with the complaint. a Counsel for
Arbogast granted BLS at least two extensions to make a settlement offer, to seek Utah counsel, or both. According to
River Crossings, counsel for Arbogast then told BLS in June 2006 that he would not seek default without first notifying it.
jFOOTNOTES
I I River Crossings' counsel on appeal did not represent River Crossings during any of the proceedings in the trial court.

l*P4] On June 28, 2006, BLS communicated a settlement offer to Arbogast's counsel. The next day, counsel for
Arbogast sent a letter to BLS rejecting the offer. The letter also stated as follows:
My client has previously granted your [***3] client an extension of time within which to answer the
complaint. However, given the [**42] present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client, hereby
requesting that your client file an Answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter.

[*P5] On June 30, the BLS attorney primarily responsible for the River Crossings matter was terminated. However, the
June 29 letter was addressed to two other members of the firm who had taken responsibility for the case. On July 25,
River Crossings' managing member sent an e-mail to Arbogast's principal. Although the e-mail requested that Arbogast's
principal call River Crossings' managing member in order to "discuss the direction of [the] lawsuit," no further
communication occurred. Six days iater-approximateiy four months after sen/ice of the complaint and more than thirty
days after the June 29 letter requesting an answer--Arbogast obtained a certificate of default from the court clerk.
Arbogast did not provide River Crossings a copy of this certificate or its subsequent request for default judgment. On
August 10, the trial judge entered a default judgment Notice of the judgment was sent to River Crossings on August 15.
[*P6] River [***4] Crossings filed a rule 60 motion to set aside the default judgment on September 26, 2006, and
arguments were held February 21, 2007. 2 During arguments, River Crossings' Utah legal counsel acknowledged that
"this is a close case." Counsel also conceded that a formal appearance had not been entered and that "[Arbogast] didn't
need to give notice [of the default motions] under Rule 5(a)(2)." In fact, counsel declared that he was "not claiming that
because an appearance was made notice should have been given." The trial court determined "that [River Crossings']
actions and inactions in this matter d[id] not rise to the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or mistake."
The trial court also found that although BLS did not formally appear in the action, "counsel's notification and
communications with [ArbogasfJ's counsel constitute an appearance and there was adequate notice . . . given to [River
Crossings], pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter." Accordingly, the court denied River Crossings' motion. River Crossings
appeals.
I FOOTNOTES

)

|

j 2 By this time, River Crossings had hired a Utah law firm to represent it before the trial court.

j

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P7] River Crossings presents [***5] three arguments on appeal. First, River Crossings argues that the default
judgment should have been set aside because Arbogast failed to provide the notice required by rule 5(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. HN1^n[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for
correctness." Brown v. Glover. 2000 UT 89. P15, 16 P.3d 540.
[*P8] Second, River Crossings argues that "the district court abusefd] its limited discretion in refusing to set aside the
default judgment." HN2+"[A] trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment." Lund v.
Brown. 2000 UT 75, P 9, 11 P.3d 277. However, "the court's discretion is not unlimited." Id.
[*P9] Third, River Crossings argues that the trial court's "refusfal] to set aside the default judgment [was] based on
faulty findings of fact." " " - ^ h i s court will reverse a trial court's factual findings only if the marshaled evidence
demonstrates that they are clearly erroneous. See Bingham Consolidation Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434. P 14r 105
P.3d 365.
ANALYSIS
I. Rule 5(a)
[*P10] Because of River Crossings' statements before the trial court and Arbogast's arguments on appeal, we begin by
addressing whether River Crossings' [***6] rule 5 arguments were preserved.3 WW4"?"'[A]s a general rule, claims not
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raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.'" Tschaaoenv v. Milbank Ins. Co.. 2007 UT 37. 20. r**431
163 P.3d 615 (alteration in original) (quoting Stare v. Cram. 2002 UT 37. P 9. 46 P.3d 230V
Two policy considerations underlie th[is] preservation rule. First, the rule exists to give the trial court an
opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it. Second, requiring preservation of an
issue prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if
the strategy fails.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
; FOOTNOTES
; 3 Our inquiry is made more difficult by River Crossings' failure to provide a "citation to the record showing that the
i issue was preserved" as required by rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)
(A).

[*P11] In this case, River Crossings' trial counsel did very little to raise the rule 5 issue before the trial court4 and
actually made statements during oral arguments that conflict with its position on appeal. Nevertheless, the trial court
specifically considered this issue and expressly [***7] found
[t]hat pursuant to [the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] Rule 5(a)(2), [River Crossings'] counsel has not
formally appeared in the instant action. Nevertheless, [River Crossings'] counsel's notification and
communications with [Arbogastjs counsel constitute an appearance and there was adequate notice [] given
to [River Crossings], pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter, that an answer was required to be filed in
. response to [Arbogast]'s complaint.
The trial court's findings do not simply mirror River Crossings' concessions but instead demonstrate a deeper analysis,
which expressly addresses the application of rule 5. River Crossings does not challenge the trial court's finding that an
appearance was entered, but rather the court's legal interpretation of rule 5 as stated in its ruling. Neither of the two
policy considerations for the preservation requirement prevent our review where the trial court has actually ruled on the
issue, and River Crossings' arguments do not suggest a strategic decision to postpone review. We therefore hold that,
under the facts of this case, this issue is sufficiently preserved for appellate review. 5 Cf. Pratt v. Nelson. 2007 UT 41. P
24. 164 P.3d 366 [***8] (determining issue was preserved where trial court received some notice of the issue and
"made a specific ruling on the issue" even though petitioner did not address it in a timely manner).
I FOOTNOTES
; 4 River Crossings argues that it "tirelessly raised the issue of lack of notice of the default proceedings at every stage
, in this litigation." While River Crossings did address the lack of notice before the trial court, its arguments focused on
j whether notice was required because of Arbogast's assurance that it would not seek default without first notifying
\ BLS. That issue is distinct from the issue on appeal, i.e., whether River Crossings was entitled to notice under rule 5
j of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
} 5 We caution that a concession by trial counsel generally will prevent appellate review. See First Equity Corp. of
j Florida v. Utah State Univ.. 544 P.2d 887. 892 n.5 (Utah 19751 ("Ordinarily, an appellant cannot raise a theory on
| appeal for the first time different from that presented to the Court below."); see also Pratt v. Nelson. 2007 UT 41, P
I 17. 164 P.3d 366 ("[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court
I into committing the error."). [***9] However, this case is unique because the trial court independently researched,
j analyzed, and determined the issue at hand, and that determination is part of the decision on appeal.

[*P12] Having determined that this issue is properly before us, we turn now to its merits. Hyv5?Rule 5(a) declares that
"every judgment, every order. . . , every pleading . . . , every paper . . . , every written motion . . . , and every written
notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties." Utah R. Civ.
P. 5(a)(1). The rule "expresses the general principle that notice of all proceedings^ including default proceedings,] must
be provided to all parties." Lund. 2000 UT 75. PP 20-27. 11 P.3d 277. However, M[n]o service need be made on parties in
default. , . for failure to appear." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2).
[*P13] River Crossings argues that the trial court correctly determined that it had entered an appearance, but erred
when it ruled that "adequate notice was given to [River Crossings] pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter." Because we
agree with Arbogast's argument that the trial court erred when it determined that River Crossings had entered an
appearance, we need not address [***10] [**44] River Crossings* contention regarding the sufficiency of notice.
[*P14] Two cases from the Utah Supreme Court have interpreted rule 5 and addressed what constitutes an
appearance. In Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982)r defense counsel contacted the plaintiffs
counsel after the complaint was filed, advised counsel that he was representing the defendants, and discussed the
complaint. See id. at 1010. The next day, defense counsel wrote a letter "requesting copies of the pleadings and all other
documents." Id. The plaintiffs counsel "answered the letter, refusing to supply documentation to aid . . . in making a
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special appearance, but expressing a willingness to cooperate if [the defendants] appeared generally." Id. A few weeks
later, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment without notifying the defendants or serving them under rule 5. See id.;
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 5. On appeal, the defendants argued that the default should be set aside because the plaintiff
"had an obligation under RuleM 5 . . . to notify" the defendants. Central Bank & Trust 656 P.2d at 1011. The supreme
court disagreed, "concluding] that plaintiff was under no duty to notify defendants [***11] of the default," id,, and
subsequently explained that the Central Bank & Trust defendants "never made an appearance prior to having default
judgment entered against [them]," Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75. P 27. 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust); see
also Central Bank & Trust 656 P.2d at 1011-12 & n.2 (emphasizing that "[n]o service need be made on parties in default
for failure to appear" (emphasis omitted)).'
[*P15] In Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75. 11 P.3d 277. the plaintiffs filed a complaint, and the defendants filed an answer
and counterclaim. See id.P 3. However, the plaintiffs never filed a reply to the counterclaim, and the defendants obtained
default judgment without serving the plaintiffs with copies of the default papers pursuant to rule 5. See id. P4-5. The
plaintiffs appealed the default judgment, arguing that they were entitled to service under rule 5. See id. PP 1. 6, The
supreme court agreed and reversed the default judgment. 6 See id. P 1. Notably, the supreme court distinguished Lund
from Central Bank & Trust on the basis that Lund involved a "formal appearance" while Central Bank & Trust did not. See
id. P 27.
FOOTNOTES
\ 6 The plaintiffs in Lund actually presented two arguments on* [***12] appeal: (1) "[T]hat they were reasonably
| justified, for rule 60(b) purposes, in not replying to the [defendants' counterclaim" and (2) "that the [defendants'
(failure to notify them of the default motion justifies their failure to respond." Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75, 14, 11 P.3d
I 277. The supreme court found sufficient justification to reverse based solely on the first issue. See id. P20. The court
I then addressed the second argument "to clarify the requirements of the procedural rules." Id. The court determined
; there was "additional justification" for reversal based on the defendants' failure to comply with rule 5. Id.

[*P16] Based on these two supreme court rulings, Arbogast argues that unless a party enters a formal appearance
through a pleading in the trial court, it has not appeared and is not entitled to service under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Because we believe Central Bank & Trust and Lund dictate this result, we agree.
[*P17] To fully understand the import of Central Bank & Trust and Lund, it is helpful to examine the manner in which
other jurisdictions, and especially the federal courts, have interpreted similar rules. See id. (relying on outside sources).
These jurisdictions [***13] have adhered to one of two conflicting positions when determining what constitutes an
appearance.
[*P18] The first, and the majority position, "is that 'the notice requirement. . .' applies not only to parties who have
formally appeared, but also to 'those parties who, although delaying in a formal sense by foiling to file pleadings within
the twenty-day period, have otherwise indicated to the moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit.'" New York v.
Green, 420 F.3d 99. 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktienoesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 139 U.S.
ADD. D.C. 256, 432 F.2d 689. 691 (D.C Cir. 1970) (per curiam)); see also id. (collecting cases); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1996) ("What constitutes an appearance is not confined to physical appearances in
[**45] court or the actual filing of a document in the record."(internal quotation marks omitted)). River Crossings
argues that Utah has adopted this standard. 7 However, if this were truly the standard in Utah, we believe Central Bank &
Trust would have been decided differently or disavowed by Lund. 8
] FOOTNOTES

j

i

i

\ 7 Even if Utah had adopted this standard, it is questionable whether River Crossings' actions actually indicated "a
j clear [***14] purpose to defend the suit." See New York v. Green. 420 F.3d 99f 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal
j quotation marks omitted). Although River Crossings participated in multiple settlement discussions, it did so through
j its Nevada counsel; it does not appear that River Crossings obtained Utah counsel—a necessary step for defending a
j lawsuit in Utah—until after the default judgment had been entered. See generally Utah Supreme Court Rules of ProPI
I Practice R. 14-802 ("[0]nly persons who are active, licensed members of the Bar in good standing may engage in the
j practice of law in Utah.").

!
j
j
I
j
\

•

j

18 The supreme court did acknowledge in Lund that "[a] much more compelling case can be made for requiring notice j
j to a party who is in default but has nonetheless elected to participate ar some level." 200Q UT 75. P 24. 11 P.3d 277 I
j (emphasis added). However, the court was not discussing what constitutes an appearance. See id. PP 23-26. Rather, |
I the court was addressing whether or not service was required when a party appeared and then defaulted. See id. 4, j
j 23-26 (addressing situation where, after filing the complaint, the plaintiffs did not answer the defendants'
I
j counterclaim because they believed the action was stayed when [***15] the plaintiff filed for bankruptcy).
j
1 Moreover, far from disavowing Central Bank & Trust, the court reaffirmed that case by reiterating that n[i]n Central
I
[ Bank & Trust, the defaulting party never made an appearance." Id. P 27.

[*P19] In Central Bank & Trust, the defendants not only had multiple contacts; with the plaintiffs, but also specifically
discussed the complaint with plaintiffs' counsel and indicated that they intended to defend by entering a special
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821 P.2d 465, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("A special appearance is to contest a court's personal jurisdiction without
submitting oneself to it."). Nevertheless, the supreme court later determined that the defendants "never made an
appearance." Lund. 2000 UT 75. P 27. 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust). Thus, Central Bank & Trust departs
from with the majority rule, which merely requires an indication of "a clear purpose to defend the suit." See Green, 420
F.3d at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[*P20] On the other hand, the position applied by a minority of jurisdictions is consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's rulings in Central [***16] Bank & Trust and Lund. Under this standard, H/V6:?courts "strictly construe[] the term
'appearance' to require a party to make 'some presentation or submission to the district court in the pending action.'" Id±
(quoting Zuelzke Tool & Ena'g Co. v. Anderson Die Castings. Inc.. 925 F.2d 226. 230 (7th Cir. 1991)): accord Plaza del
Laao Townhomes Ass'n v. Hiohwood Builders. LLC. 148 P.3d 367. 370-71 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006); see also Black's Law
Dictionary 107 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "appearance" as "[a] coming into court as a party or interested
person" (emphasis added)); 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 5 55.33[4][b1 (3d ed. 2008) ("The
Seventh Circuit has the better linguistic and practical argument"). 9 Under this standard, the supreme court's rulings in
Central Bank & Trust and Lund are easily understood. In Central Bank & Trust, the defendant never made any
presentation to the district court, see 656 P.2d at 1009-10, and thus "never made an appearance," Lund v. Brown. 2000
UT 75, 27. 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust). In Lund, the plaintiffs made a presentation to the district court
by filing a complaint and, therefore, were deemed to have appeared. See id.
FOOTNOTES
I 9 Because [***17] the court clerk is authorized to enter default judgment under rule 55 only if the party is in
\ default for failure to appear and the other requirements are met, see Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b), one of the benefits of the
; minority position is that it creates a bright-line test that the clerk can use when determining whether or not default is
| appropriate. In contrast, "[t]he clerk is in no position to know whether there have been discussions or documents
\ exchanged among the parties and thus, under the majority definition of the term, cannot determine with certainty
I whether any party has or has not 'appeared' in the action." 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice §
J 55.33f4]fb1 (3d ed. 2008).

;
!
)
I
I

[*P21] Despite the holdings of Central Bank & Trust and Lund, River Crossings [**46] argues that Utah could not
have adopted the minority position because it would be incompatible with Utah's Standards of Professionalism and
Civility. We do not believe the two are incompatible. The Standards of Professionalism and Civility require notice before
obtaining default. See Utah Standards of Professionalism & Civility 16 ("Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a default
without first notifying other counsel whose [***18] identity is known . . . ."). Rule 5, on the other hand, concerns
service at the time of filing. See Utah R. Civ. P. 5. Thus, a party can easily comply with the standards of civility, even
though service is not required under rule 5. For example, in this case, counsel would have acted in conformity with the
standards of civility, even though he did not serve the actual papers under rule 5. ifhe had first called defense counsel
and alerted him that default was imminent. 10
J FOOTNOTES

j

110 During oral arguments on appeal, counsel for Arbogast stated that he believed his June 29, 2006 letter constituted |
j sufficient notice under the Standards of Professionalism and Civility. We have no reason to question the sincerity of |
I that belief. We think, however, the applicable standard requires more than a prospective notice that a complaint will j
j be due in twenty days. Otherwise, a summons, which by rule informs a defendant when an answer is due, see Utah R. j
j Civ. P. 4(c)(1), would also be sufficient notice, and the applicable standard would have added little. We therefore
j
I interpret this particular standard as requiring notice after the allotted passage of time for filing an answer but before j
j a party actually seeks [***19] to obtain the entry of default.
I

[*P22] Although the supreme court has never explicitly addressed the two competing lines of authority or defined what
constitutes an appearance under rule 5, we believe the holdings of Central Bank & Trust and Lund place us among the
jurisdictions that require a presentation or submission to the district court. Because River Crossings' legal counsel, like
the defendants' legal counsel in Central Bank & Trust, never "ma[d]e some presentation or submission to the district
court," Green. 420 F.3d at 105, we hold that River Crossings never made an appearance pursuant to rule 5. For these
reasons, we affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue.
II. Rule 60(b)
[*P23] River Crossings argues "the district court abused its discretion in refusing to set a[si]de the default judgment
[because River Crossings] presented a 'reasonable excuse' for failing to File a responsive pleading." (Capitalization
omitted.)"" 7 ? Under rule 60(b), a "court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 60
(b). Although a trial court has broad [***20] discretion when determining whether to set aside default judgment under
rule 60(b), "the court's discretion is not unlimited." Lund. 2000 UT 75. P 9. 11 P.3d 277. Indeed, "the [disfavored] nature
of a default judgment and the equitable nature of rule 60 provide . . . limits." Id. P 10. Thus, "it is quite uniformly
regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside." Id. P 11 (internal quotation
marks omitted). In this case,
however,
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[*P24] River Crossings presents several arguments that it claims demonstrate a "good faith, legitimate belief that no
action would or could be taken against them." See id. P 19 (determining such a belief "constitutes a 'reasonable
justification or excuse'"). 31
j FOOTNOTES
! i i River Crossings' primary argument to the trial court was that counsel had mistakenly believed the Utah Rules of
[ Civil Procedure were similar to the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which require three days notice before entering
! default judgment when a party has appeared. Compare Utah R. Civ. P. 55, with [***21] Nev. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
I See also McNairv. Rivera, 110 Nev. 463. 874 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Nev. 1994) ("An appearance for purposes of NRCP 55 j
j (b)(2) does not require a presentation or submission to the court; indeed, a course of negotiation between attorneys j
\ is sufficient to constitute an appearance . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)). River Crossings does not raise
j this argument on appeal.

[*P25] First, River Crossings argues that "[b]ased on [Arbogast's counsel's express representation[] that he would not
initiate default proceedings against River Crossings without first notifying opposing counsel, River [**47] Crossings
reasonably and justifiably believed that no action would be taken against it." Arbogast argues that it made this
representation, if at all, only so that River Crossings would have adequate time to present a settlement offer or obtain
local counsel. 12 Arbogast further argues that once counsel sent the June 29, 2006 letter rejecting River Crossings'
settlement offer and requesting an answer, it was no longer reasonable for River Crossings to believe that it need not
answer the complaint. The trial court agreed with Arbogast and found "[t]hat the contention that [River Crossings']
counsel [***22] expected notice prior to the default entry is unfounded given the express provisions of the June 29,
2006 letter" requesting that an answer be filed.
j FOOTNOTES
j 12 Arbogast primarily contends that no such statement promising notification before default was made.

[*P26] Second, River Crossings argues that it has a reasonable excuse for not filing an answer because the attorney at
BLS "who had been responsible for negotiating and communicati[ng] with [Arbogast] was discharged, and the attorney
who assumed those responsibilities went on an extended vacation." However, as the trial court found, the discharged BLS
attorney was removed from the case before the June 29, 2006 letter. Indeed, the June 29 letter was sent to the two
lawyers who had assumed the responsibilities of the discharged attorney. Moreover, even if one of the replacement
attorneys was on extended vacation, the other attorney was not. In fact, River Crossings declared to the trial court that it
"d[id]n't want to make a big fact about" the other lawyer's vacation "because [her colleague] was aware of what was
going on." 13 Despite this awareness, no answer was filed. Thus, the trial court found that this "excuse[] . . . d[id] not
constitute f ***23] excusable neglect, inadvertent surprise or mistake."
I FOOTNOTES
j 13 Even if counsel was not aware of the proceedings in this case, we are not convinced that relief under rule 60(b)
| would be required. See generally Swallow v. Kennard. 2008 UTApp 134, PP 16. 21-24, 183 P.3d 1052 (holding
j problems with counsel's mail were not sufficient grounds for rule 60 relief where counsel did not act with due
j diligence).

j
j
j

[*P27] Third, River Crossings argues that its "attorneys believed that settlement negotiations were ongoing." River
Crossings bases this argument primarily on an e-mail that its managing member sent directly to Arbogast's principal—but
not to Arbogast's counsel. In that e-mail, River Crossings' managing member simply stated, "Give me a call when you get
a chance. We should probably discuss the direction of your lawsuit." Even assuming that the e-mail implied continued
settlement discussions, it was not reasonable to assume that it freed River Crossings from filing an answer. This is
especially true because the e-mail was not sent by River Crossings' legal counsel, Arbogast never responded to the email, and Arbogast had explicitly rejected River Crossings' settlement efforts and requested an answer [***24] in its
June 29 letter. Accordingly, the trial court found that River Crossings failed to exercise due diligence and that it was this
failure that ultimately resulted in the default judgment.
[*P28] After reviewing River Crossings' arguments, the facts of the case, and the trial court's rulings, we cannot say
the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion. River Crossings conceded to the trial court that "this is a close case."
Because "a trial court has [such] broad discretion" on this issue, Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75. P 9. 11 P.3d 277, we will
not reverse an admittedly, and demonstrably, "close case." We recognize that " w *?default judgments are generally
disfavored, but "[i]n the absence of an abuse of discretion, we [will] not undertake to substitute our idea of what is
proper for that of the trial court." G.M. Leasing Corp. v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co.. 534 P.2d 1244. 1245 (Utah 1975;)
(refusing to substitute judgment on trial court's issuance of sanctions). Although we might have reached a different
conclusion in the first instance, we affirm the trial court's ruling that River Crossings did not show reasonable justification
or excuse for its failure to answer.
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III. The Trial Court's [***25] Findings of Fact
[*P29] River Crossings' final contention is that the "district court's refusal to set aside [**48] the default judgment
was based on faulty findings of fact."
[*P30] River Crossings argues the trial court incorrectly found that, other than the June 29, 2006 letter, "[t]here were
not any . . . discussions between [Arbogast]'s counsel and [River Crossings'] counsel between . . . June 29, 2006 and
August 18, 2006." However, River Crossings acknowledges that "the district court's finding is perhaps technically
correct." In fact, the record before us indicates the trial court's ruling was correct. There is nothing in the record
demonstrating any communication from River Crossings' legal counsel to Arbogast's legal counsel during this time period.
The only communication is the July 25 e-mail that was sent from River Crossings' managing member to Arbogast's
principal. Thus, this finding of fact is not clearly erroneous. 1A
} FOOTNOTES
;• 14 Nor do we agree with River Crossings' argument that the trial court's finding is misleading. Not only is the trial
court's finding correct, but it helps refute River Crossings' supposed belief that settlement discussions were ongoing.
Ail of the previous settlement discussions [***26] had occurred through the parties' respective counsel. The fact
that all communication between counsel stopped after the June 29, 2006 letter suggests that settlement efforts had
ceased.

\

[*P31] River Crossings further contests the trial court's finding that the June 29, 2006 letter informed River Crossings
that Arbogast was requiring an answer within twenty days. River Crossings argues that because the letter actually stated
that Arbogast "[is] hereby requesting . . . an Answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days," the trial court's ruling is
clearly erroneous and the ruling must be reversed. We disagree. Regardless of the professional and civil tone of the June
29 letter, its message was clear: Arbogast had rejected River Crossings' settlement offer and was moving forward with
the litigation. Indeed, River Crossings acknowledged this plain implication during oral arguments. 15 Accordingly, the trial
court's finding is not clearly erroneous.
FOOTNOTES
I is The following colloquy occurred during oral arguments in the trial court:

' • j

\

)

I

[Counsel:] Our argument is that the June 29th, 2006 letter, while it said file an answer, I request that you
file an answer, there wasn't the s[word] of Damocles, if you don't, [***27] boom, you are done. . . .

I

[The Court]: Counsel, doesn't that somewhat imply that? . . .

j

[Counsel]: Well, the implication is there.

!

IV. Attorney Fees
[*P32] River Crossings does not appeal the trial court's grant of attorney fees to Arbogast, but argues that Arbogast is
not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Again, we disagree.
[*P33] The trust deed note provided that "[i]f this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of
principal or interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned . . . agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection
including a reasonable attorney's fee." Moreover, the trial court's judgment awarded Arbogast its attorney fees below.
See generally Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305. 319 (Utah 1998^ (WW9?"[W]hen a party who received attorney fees
below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
[*P34] River Crossings* only argument against an award of attorney fees on appeal is that "this appeal does not
directly relate to Arbogast's collection efforts." However, this case directly concerns Arbogast's collection efforts;
Arbogast filed suit to collect the amount it claims it was owed [***28] under the parties' agreement. Because this case
concerns Arbogast's collection efforts and because Arbogast was awarded its attorney fees below, we remand to the trial
court for a determination of the reasonable attorney fees Arbogast incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
[*P35] We affirm the trial court's denial of River Crossings' rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default judgment and
remand for a determination of the attorney fees Arbogast incurred on appeal.
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
[*P36] WE CONCUR:
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